SCARCE to a BUGLER //

EGYPT 1882 MEDAL NAMED TO: 2130. BUGLER CHARLES ALLSOP. 3rd. KING'S ROYAL RIFLE CORPS.

Clasps: TEL-EL-KEBIR, SUAKIN 1885 & EL-TEB-TAMAAI.

Condition: GVF:

Comes with research.

EGYPT KHEDIVE'S MEDAL DATE 1884-6.

Condition: GVF.

EGYPT MEDAL NAMED TO: 797. CORP. C. ALLCORN. 1/GORDON HIGHLANDERS.

Clasps: THE NILE 1884-86& EL-TEB-TAMAAI & THE NILE 1884-86.

Condition: VF

EGYPT MEDAL NAMED TO: 1330. PTE. W. HARMER. 1/GORDON HIGHLANERS.

Clasps: THE NILE 1884-86& EL-TEB-TAMAAI & THE NILE 1884-86.

Condition: VF

EGYPT 1882 MEDAL NAMED TO: 18. PTE. S. COLYER. 1/GORDON HIGHLANERS.

Clasps: TEL-EL-KEBIRI, SUAKIN 1884 & EL-TEB-TAMAAI.

Condition: VF

SCARCE // ABU KLEA CLASP //

EGYPT MEDAL NAMED TO:2013. L/CORP. T. RADCLIFF. 16th. LANCERS.

Clasps:THE NILE & ABU KLEA.

Condition: VF

EGYPT 1882 MEDAL NAMED TO:1694. PTE. J. SHARPLES 19th. HUSSARS.

Clasps: TEL-EL-KIBIR, SUAKIN 1884, EL-TEB _ TAMAAI & THE NILE 1884-85.

Condition: VF.

Comes with Researh

SCARCE  TO A DRUMMER //

EGYPT 1882 MEDAL NAMED TO:2062. C. McCARTHY. 2nd. MANCHESTER REGIMENT.

No clasp.

Condition: VF.

SCARCE TWO CLASP 5th LANCERS EGYPT MEDAL //

EGYPT 1882 MEDAL NAMED TO: 2210. E CONNORS. 5th LANCERS. (IRISH).

Clasp: SUAKIN 1885 & TOFREK.

Condition: GVF

SCARCE //

EGYPT 1882 MEDAL NAMED TO: 1145. TPR. R. BORROWMAN. 2nd. LIFE GUARDS.

Clasps: THE NILE 1884-85 & ABU KLEA.

Condition: VF

EGYPT 1882 MEDAL NAMED TO: 2780. DRUMMER. T. REYNOLDS. 2/ROYAL IRISH.

Clasp: THE NILE 1884-85

Condition: VF.

EGYPT MEDAL NAMED TO: 2536. D. AUDEN. 1st. ROYAL IRISH REGT. (ROYAL MARINES)

Clasp: THE NILE 1884-85

Condition: VF.

Comes with Research

SCARCE TO THE MARINES //

EGYPT MEDAL NAMED TO: J. BARDSWELL. PTE. R.M.L.I.

Clasp: THE NILE 1884-85, ABU KLEA

Condition: VF.

Comes with Attestation Papers confirming clasps.

As General Stewart’s force approached the wells at Abu Klea on 16th January 1884, piquets of the 19th Hussars, scouting ahead of the main column, encountered parties of Mahdists. It could be seen that a large force was established at the wells and ready to give battle. The British had left the last water some 43 miles before and were in need of replenishment. Nevertheless it was apparent that Abu Klea could only be taken by assault. Stewart halted two miles short of Abu Klea and camped.The night was a busy one. A thorn bush zereba or compound was built. The British camp was under constant sniper fire and preparations had to be made for the formation of the attack.

With daylight a strong force of Mahdists could be seen formed up to the left of the zereba. Several unsuccessful attempts were made to lure this force into attacking by sending a strong force forward which then retreated into the zereba. As this ploy had no effect General Stewart resolved to advance to the wells at Abu Klea in a square formation.The Mounted Infantry were positioned in the left front corner of the square. The Guards Camel Regiment (Foot Guards and Royal Marine Light Infantry) took the right front corner. The Heavy Camel Regiment took the left rear corner and the rear face while the Sussex Regiment took the rear of the right face. The troops marched on foot with the camels bunched in the centre of the square. The guns marched in the centre of the front face. The Gardner gun with its Royal Navy gun team, under Captain Lord Berseford RN, took the rear of the centre, ready to be rushed to any point of crisis. The main part of the 19th Hussars was posted to the left of the square with a small detachment on the right.

At 0730 the square began its difficult and cumbersome advance, the aim being to pass the flank of the Mahdist position and force an attack. As the square moved forward skirmishers from the Guards and Mounted Infantry moved out to engage the Mahdist riflemen with fire. The ground was broken and the square formation became severely distorted with the rear lagging back, forced out of place by the vagaries of the movement of the camels. As casualties were inflicted by the sniping rifle fire camels had to be stopped to be loaded with the wounded, who had to be given first aid, thereby causing the camels to lag and further distort the formation. The officers in front, who controlled the movement of the square, gave insufficient consideration to the difficulties being experienced at the rear. As a result gaps opened up at crucial points in the corners and rear of the square.Much of the Mahdist fire was coming from a gully that ran parallel to the route the British were taking on its left flank. General Stewart ordered that skirmishers be sent out from the Heavy Regiment to neutralize this fire. At around 0930 it became clear that the Mahdist army was about to attack the front left corner of the square. The square was wheeled to the right to move onto higher ground. A large force of probably around 3,000 Mahdists, armed with spears and swords, appeared from the nearby gully and charged the square.

At this point the British were hampered by the presence of their skirmishers who had to be permitted to regain the square before fire could be opened. The Mahdist assault was consequently within 200 yards or less of the square before the first volleys were delivered. The charge was delivered at the section of the front left face held by the Mounted Infantry Regiment of the Camel Corps. Captain Lord Beresford brought his Gardner gun from its position at the rear of the square and took it out through the Mounted Infantry position and opened fire on the charging Mahdists. After firing some 70 rounds the Gardner gun jammed. Before it could be cleared the Mahdist spearmen overwhelmed the Royal Navy detachment manning the Gardner and killed all but Lord Beresford, who fell under the gun, and one of the ratings. Probably due to the heavy volley firing from the Mounted Infantry and shrapnel from the 3 guns in the front face, the charge continued on down the left face of the square and fell on the fragmented corner held by the Heavy Cavalry regiment, where the Mahdists broke into the square.

The troopers of the Heavy Cavalry Camel Regiment were defending themselves with the long infantry rifle, a weapon they were unfamiliar with. The cavalry officers had no experience of fighting an infantry square. It seems to be the universal view of informed senior officers that the cavalry officers took insufficient care to ensure the integrity of the square formation. As happened at Tamaai, with the break of the square, many of the officers and non-commissioned officers standing to the rear of the line became casualties. The charge of the Mahdists into the centre of the square was impeded by the mass of camels, which prevented the Mahdists from reaching the rear ranks of the opposing faces. The rear rank of the Mounted Infantry in the front face and the Foot Guards and Royal Marines of the Guards regiment in the right face turned about and opened a devastating fire on the Mahdists. After some hectic minutes the Mahdists who had broken into the square were shot down and the charge died away. The battle was over after ten hectic minutes. The 19th Hussars moved forward and took possession of the wells at Abu Klea. By 1300 the square had reformed and the wounded taken care of so the force could moved forward to the wells which were reached by 1600. In the evening a party of mounted infantry returned to the overnight zereba and brought up the garrison and wounded left there. Casualties: British casualties were 71 killed and 64 wounded. Of the 11 officers killed, 7 were cavalry officers.